Why Dawkins should believe in God

The modernist consensus would have one believe that William Paley was a poor philosopher, whose teleological argument for the existence of God has been destroyed by the theory of evolution by natural selection, as propounded by Darwin and his latter-day disciple, Richard Dawkins. On the first count I would have to render a grudging assent, although I might add that The God Delusion, Dawkins’ pathetic attempt to engage in theological philosophy, surpasses by light years Paley’s crude watchmaker analogy in its lack of any clearly formulated logical argument. But it is the issue of the Watchmaker which presently concerns me, that is to say the validity of inferring the existence of God from the evidence of design in the world. With regard to this particular theistic argument, Dawkins presents a more persuasive rebuttal, not via logic (which he seems incapable of comprehending) but rather via the results of the scientific method, indicating both the possibility of arriving at complex organisms from simple structures without any designer, and the probability, on the basis of the evidence, that such a process actually occurred. This being so, one is certainly not justified in drawing the conclusion that the appearance of design in the universe necessitates the existence of a universal designer, as the alternative of The Blind Watchmaker is not only possible, but highly probable. Having admitted all this, it may come as a shock that I regard the teleological argument, properly formulated, as persuasive. The problem with most such arguments, however, almost always lies with the existence, or rather the non-existence, of a properly formulated version. St. Anselm laid the ontological argument open to the so-called ‘Buddhist objection’ by stating vaguely that existence is greater than non-existence. If he had defined his concept of greatness, say in terms of number of qualities, that objection could be dismissed with contempt, but as he failed to do so it has done great harm to the reputation of his argument. The same is true of the teleological argument. The crux of this argument is not really evidence of design but rather the principle of causality. By this I mean the principle by which one presumes non-existence unless a reason is given for existence. If one accepts nothingness as the state of nature, then one must always posit a positive reason for anything. A teleological argument based on causality thus runs like this; the existence of something implies a reason for its existence which is also a thing and as the universe is a thing, its existence requires a reason, which can only be God. The evidence of design is the very existence of the universe, which implies a telos, a reason, an end. This formulation of the teleological I argument I think justifiable, for the reasons I shall now set out.

Coke once said that ‘Magna Carta … will have no Sovereign’, by which he meant that it was such a fundamental law that if its validity was questioned the whole constitutional system, including the monarchy, would logically be questioned along with it. A similar thing may be said for causality, just read ‘scientific method’ for ‘constitutional system’. Consider the logical formulation of the ideal scientific method; in a given situation one occurrence is solely preceded by another, and thus the scientist claims that the first thing occurring was the reason for the second thing occurring. Of course, this theory can rarely, if ever, be put into practice; the most a scientist can say is that as far as one can see, taking all precautions humanly possible etc., in a given situation one occurrence is solely preceded by another, and thus the first thing occurring was the reason for the second thing occurring, with the aforesaid limiting formula being necessarily added to the conclusion as well. This, however, does not change the ideal scientific method beyond the addition of a limiting formula, and as the practical scientific method derives the legitimacy of its more hesitant conclusions from the knowledge that the ideal scientific method would yield logically certain conclusions, it is the latter method that will be considered. Logically formulating this method formally, in terms of premises and conclusions, would result in the following:

1. In a given situation, occurrence Y is solely preceded by occurrence X
2. Occurrence X is thus the reason for occurrence Y happening

On the validity of this argument rests the validity of the scientific method. Regardless of whether one is justified to proceed from a given situation to a universal rule by induction, if one cannot justifiably say that even in a given situation X is the reason for Y then the scientist has no capacity to come to any scientific conclusion whatsoever. Now it is apparent that in order for conclusion 2 to logically follow from premise 1 one must supply an antecedent premise 0, that is:

0. Every occurrence has a reason, which is also an occurrence

If premise 0 is not true then one is not justified in drawing conclusion 2 from premise 1. Only if it absolutely necessary to posit a reason for an occurrence, which is also an occurrence, can one say that the preceding of Y by X alone entails that X is the reason for Y, as Y will require an explanation which is an occurrence, and as X is the only other occurrence available it must that explanation. Premise 0, the principle of causality, is thus the Magna Carta of the scientific method; the truth of the former must be accepted if the truth of the latter is also to be accepted. If it is rational to believe in science, it is rational to believe in causality. The scientific method, logically formulated in full, must therefore run thus:

0. Every occurrence has a reason, which is also an occurrence
1. In a given situation, occurrence Y is solely preceded by occurrence X
2. Occurrence X is thus the reason for occurrence Y happening

Dawkins prides himself on his belief in science, and as I have just shown, that belief logically rests on an acceptance of causality. Thus, by believing in the scientific method, Dawkins, and I would hope the majority of humanity, enter the realm of teleological arguments; we all must accept that things have a reason and a purpose of some sort if we wish to use science to arrive at knowledge. I have not, nor was it my intention, to prove that causality is a rationally necessary principle; I merely state that if one thinks oneself rational in believing in the scientific method, then one must think oneself rational in believing in causality. Here I must beg leave to destroy a miserable subterfuge employed by enemies of the cosmological and teleological arguments, namely the fact that the supposed results of the scientific method indicate electrons appearing for no reason whatsoever, so-called Heisenbergian uncertainty. These results are used as evidence that causality is not a true principle. It is surely evident, however, that these results are invalid as they contradict the method by which they were arrived at. It is not legitimate for a conclusion of a particular methodology to destroy the methodology which produced it. The absurdity of the opposite statement can be demonstrated if we adapt the logical formulation of the scientific method to the circumstances of a Heisenbergian uncertainty experiment:

0. Every occurrence has a reason, which is also an occurrence
1. In a given situation, the occurrence of an electron appearing is solely preceded by nothing whatsoever
2. Nothing whatsoever is the reason for the occurrence of an electron appearing

Any scientific conclusion that tries to deny causality must, as seen above, be rejected, as the two premises from which it was drawn are contradictory, and in any case it does not logically follow from the premises. The principle of causality must therefore be accepted with the same degree of certainty as the scientific method itself.

Returning to the teleological argument based on causality that I have proposed, it is clear that the first premise, that the existence of something implies a reason for that thing, which is also a thing, is as rationally justified as the scientific method itself. Dawkins at least, therefore, ought to accept it as true, and thus also accept its logical consequences. If causality is true, then just as one cannot say that an electron’s appearance is due to nothing, one must equally posit a reason for everything finite, the former, of necessity being infinite. The logical formulation of the scientific method can again be used to demonstrate the truth of this statement:

0. Every occurrence has a reason, which is also an occurrence
1. The occurrence of everything finite is solely preceded by occurrence X
2. Occurrence X is thus the reason for the occurrence of everything finite

Perhaps my choice of language here has been clumsy; the word occurrence seems to imply only events, whereas causality, as demonstrated previously, applies to everything. But this is only nit-picking; if one wishes one can read ‘thing’ for occurrence, or use any other term to signify members of the universal set. The argument would not be damaged by such a substitution. As all will immediately notice, the reason I have posited for everything finite is an unspecified occurrence X. The crucial question is thus, what can X stand for which will yield a sound argument? Clearly it cannot stand for ‘nothing’, for the reasons given in the previous paragraph. If X were to stand for something, however, the argument would be valid. Yet this does not prove God; the something, after all, could be merely a particle. In order for the argument to be sound, though, the conclusion must not just follow from the premises, the premises themselves have to be true. Now if X were to stand for any finite thing premise 1 could not be true, as it would entail a contradiction; if X precedes the occurrence of everything finite, then it obviously cannot be finite itself. One therefore must come to the conclusion that X is something, and that it is not finite, in other words, it is an infinite thing. To reformulate the argument:

0. Every occurrence has a reason, which is also an occurrence
1. The occurrence of everything finite is solely preceded by occurrence X
2. Occurrence X is an occurrence of a thing that is not finite, that is, infinite
3. The occurrence of an infinite thing is thus the reason for the occurrence of everything finite

Again, for occurrence one may legitimately read ‘existence’, ‘thing’ etc. It is conceivable that one might accept the conclusion that an infinite thing is the reason for existence of the universe, but reject the proposition that that thing matches the classical definition of God. An infinite thing, as opposed to quality, however, implies complete unlimitedness, that is, a thing which is infinite in infinite respects, rather than infinite in just one (which is anyway contradictory as you cannot set the quality of unlimitedness in the bounds of a finite quality). It therefore matches the classical definition of God, the reason why the universe exists.

Central to the argument of The Blind Watchmaker is the notion that evolution by natural selection is a simple mechanism by which the mystery of existence can be explained, whereas God is an ‘organised complexity’ which, while it admittedly does explain our existence, fails to provide justification for the belief that it is the most probable mechanism of creation. Yet, as seen above, the scientific method which yielded the theory of evolution is dependent on the principle of causality, which logically leads to the conclusion that the universe exists because of God. All evolution does is push the moment of general design back to the beginning, it does not, and cannot as a scientific theory, dispense with the need for an ultimate reason to explain the universe. This can only be God. In one of his television series, Dawkins cites an example of an aged scientist instantly recanting his life’s work when presented with evidence that it was wrong. I would suggest he does so himself in the matter of God’s existence, otherwise his faith in science must logically fall along with the deity he seeks to topple.

Traditional Anglicans to reunite with Rome

The great counter-revolutionary philosopher, the Comte de Maistre, once said that 'no religion can resist science, except one'. He was speaking in reference to the schismatical churches and Protestant groups that had separated themselves from Catholic unity, predicting that outside the true Church they would fall into philosophical indifference and agnosticism unless they returned to their allegiance. One can certainly see this prophecy being fulfilled in the turmoil which has engulfed the Anglican Communion for half a century, and which has been intensified by the recent controversy over homosexuality. This blog has made much of the Archbishop of Canterbury's liberal 'self service' approach to religion, full of optional extras like God, but at least he is a Christian, which cannot sincerely be said of most of his episcopal colleagues. It is a sad fact that around half of the bishops of the Church of England do not believe in God in any meaningful sense, and half of those that do deny most of the fundamental dogmas of the Christian faith. Now I do not exult at this, for while this state of affairs is the logical conclusion of Protestantism, any Christianity is better than none, and in many cases those Christians who, through no fault of their own, find themselves outside the visible boundaries of the Catholic Church are drawn back into the fold by that Christianity which is preserved even in heretical sects.

A shining example of this is the recent application by the Traditional Anglican Communion, a High Church splinter group which separated from Canterbury over the 'ordination' of women, for 'full, corporate [and] sacramental union'. It is rumoured that the Holy Father is pressing, despite opposition from the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, for the provision of a personal prelature, within the Catholic Church, to take pastoral care of these reunited Anglicans. The biggest stumbling block to such a move is the definitive decree of Pope Leo XIII, in his Bull Apostolicae Curae, 'that Ordinations carried out according to the Anglican rite have been and are absolutely null and utterly void'. There can be no question of setting aside an infallible decision of the Holy See. However, circumstances may have made this decree irrelevant to the issue of whether Anglican ministers are validly ordained today. Pope Leo based his decision on the doctrine that sacraments, in order to be valid, must display the correct intention. In the case of Holy Orders, therefore, the words that accompany the imposition of hands must express the intention of the bishop administering the sacrament to ordain the candidate as a bishop, priest or deacon. The issue with Anglican Orders was that the form of ordination adopted in 1552 under Edward VI did not express such an intention, as it explicitly denied the Real Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and thus did not seek to impart the priestly power to offer up the Sacrifice of the Mass to the candidate. This was as far as Apostolicae Curae went. The 'Anglican rite' it condemned was the 1552 rite. But the offending words in the latter were removed in the 1559 rite adopted under Elizabeth I. Moreover, since 1921 all Anglican ministers have been introduced into Orthodox and Old Catholic lines of apostolic succession, which are acknowledged by the Catholic Church to be valid. The hierarchical succession may (this is only an opinion) have been restored, and no obstacle might then exist between the Traditional Anglicans and their return to the bosom of Rome.

Naturally, such a reunion would have momentous consequences for the mainstream Anglican Communion. It has, for a long time now, been presented with a choice between following a Protestant path to religious subjectivism or a Catholic path back to full unity with Rome and profession of the authentic faith of Christ. We must hope and pray that it chooses the latter. Certainly, the plans to 'consecrate' women as 'bishops' (in reality these frauds will be no more than ordinary people in fancy dress), have set back the Catholic cause by some years. Lending ourselves, however, to the sweet business of speculation, if Anglicans did embrace the Catholic Faith and desire unity, consideration would have to be given to the peculiar character of especially the English Church. The TAC have indicated that they wish to be 'Anglican Catholics', with an autonomous particular church of their own, such as the Eastern Catholics have, under the supremacy of the Pope and within the Universal Church. Would such a proposal be appropriate for the Church of England? On several levels, I think it would not. Firstly, the very concept of 'Anglican Catholicism' is simply unhistorical. Anglicanism, though it retained significant Catholic elements, is essentially a schismatic group, founded and defined by separation from Rome. No comparison can be drawn, therefore, between it and the Eastern Catholic Churches, many of which are of Apostolic origin, and which, despite periods of division, were founded within the Catholic Church. The English Church has never had genuine autonomy within the Catholic Church, it has always been a part of the Latin Rite, with the Pope as its direct Patriarch as well as the visible Head of the Church in general. However, certain concessions to English ecclesial conditions certainly can be made. The Royal Supremacy was not in reality an invention of Henry VIII as forms of royal governorship over the English Church under papal supremacy had existed since the inception of the nation. Indeed, even in the post-Reformation period, the Holy See has conceded to the sovereigns of France and Spain administrative powers over their national churches, such as the power to convoke local synods, assent to their acts and appoint bishops. The role of The Queen can thus easily be maintained without prejudice to Catholic doctrine. Furthermore, England could be allowed to develop its own Catholic liturgical traditions. Before the Reformation, the Church of England used the Sarum Rite rather than the Roman forms of the Mass, and the Book of Common Prayer is indeed based on the former. A restoration of the Latin origins of the latter could pave the way towards a doctrinely accurate and ceremonially appropriate English rite of the Mass. All this is, of course, conditional on Anglicans rejecting their heresies and recent errors and returning to Catholic truth. But they do at least show that it is possible to reconcile entirely natural English national pride with the eternal and universal Revelation of Jesus Christ.

To return to de Maistre's words, why is it that Protestantism logically leads to agnosticism? Indeed, one might suspect the opposite to be true, given the Catholic acceptance of the role of reason, tradition and good words and the Protestant emphasis on sola fide. Actually, it is on the issue of faith that Protestantism falls down. God, being supremely perfect and worthy of adoration, demands complete and absolute submission to His will. This submission is what is called the obedience of faith. Every revealed truth must be assented to completely and unconditionally, just as St. Paul says Abraham did:

Yet he did not waver through unbelief regarding the promise of God, but was strengthened in his faith and gave glory to God (Romans 4:20)

The trouble with Protestantism is that its rejection of the infallible Magisterium of the Church means that it cannot rationally give the assent of faith to revealed truths, simply because it cannot determine with certainty what truths God has actually revealed. Christ, all the faithful will admit, committed Revelation to the Church. Unless that Church could unfailingly preserve that authentic faith, i.e. unless it were infallible, then it is irrational to give the complete submission of intellect and will that is the assent of faith to the truths presented in the Bible and in Apostolic Tradition. After all, the Church could have inaccurately determined the canon of the Bible; perhaps the Gnostic Gospels could have been divinely inspired? The common critique of this argument is that no one could ever give the assent of faith in the manner described. There are two points which are sufficient to dismiss this. The first is that clearly Abraham did. The second is that it is unnecessary for the success of the argument that people actually give the assent of faith to revealed truths; it only matters if it is the moral thing to do. The point is that God does not command that which is irrational; but there is nothing to suggest that a rational command is necessarily easy to obey in mankind's present state of depravity. Of course, if Christ had wished His salvation to be extended merely to those men who directly heard His message then their would be no need for infallibility, but as God wishes 'all men to be saved' He consequently will grant, and has granted, the means by which the truths of faith can be assented to with the obedience of faith.

Archbishop John Hepworth, the Primate of the TAC, wishes to complete the reunion of his Communion with Rome in time for the expected beatification of John Cardinal Newman this year. The Cardinal's virtuous life was the story of a patriotic and loyal Englishman returning to the ancient faith of his ancestors. England, as he so rightly pointed out, is not a traditionally Protestant country, rather, by history and custom, it ought to be a Catholic Nation. If the Reformation had not happened all the Anglo-Irish troubles may have been averted, the religious persecutions of the 16th and 17th centuries might have been avoided, and the Christian character of Great Britain would have been more effectively maintained. All devout Christians, be they Catholic or Anglican, should pray that the harm of that Schism be now healed by beseeching the intercession of Cardinal Newman, whose whole life was devoted to that cause, and that of the Holy and Immaculate Mother of God, the Blessed Virgin Mary, Queen of the universe, that Almighty God may hearken to our prayers.

UK bans Westboro Baptists

The Home Secretary informed the House of Commons that, after much deliberation, she had decided to invoke the Protection of Sodomy Act to prevent Fred Phelps and his daughter Shirley Phelps-Roper, members of the Westboro Baptist Church, from entering the UK. In her statement Ms. Smith insisted that this decision was in complete accordance with the principle of freedom of speech:

'This government is absolutely committed to free speech as an essential component of our democracy. It is for this reason that we have to prevent people from expressing opposition to our manifesto commitment to give sodomites, necrophiliacs and paedophiles superior rights to those possessed by decent married couples. If democracy and free speech are to be ensured we cannot allow dissent from the clear will of the 16% of the population that elected us.'

Dr. Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, expressed his support for the government's action. He told the Anglican commission tasked with erasing anything connected with the words God, Christ and morality from all English translations of the Bible that the Church had put too much emphasis on the family in the past and should now embrace 'the inevitable trend towards hermeneutical solutions at variance with traditional exegetical norms which offer relativist maxims propogating a utilitarian ethic limited in scope to the individual'. One cleric suffered a minor injury in the general rush for dictionaries.

Both members of the Phelps family banned from Britain expressed their outrage at the Home Secretary's ruling. Mrs. Phelps-Roper, surrounded by the offspring of her incestuous marriage, told reporters that she 'prayed for the return of sexual propriety in the great land that refused to accept the scum that were my ancestors and sent them to form this damnable nation of America'. She was sure that the British government had been coerced into banning her by the sorcery of the Anti-Christ, Pope Benedict XVI, who apparently is the 264th reincarnation of the original son of the Devil, St. Peter. 'Its all in the Bible', she said.

A Plea for the Lords

There is no use in mincing words. Our constitution is under attack. Successive radical governments are continuing the war that Mr. Lloyd George declared upon it when he first introduced the Parliament Bill in 1910. Now the nation has endured more that ten years of direct assault on its revered institutions, and scarcely a pen has risen to the defence of the latter. For, in this matter, the pen is indeed mightier than the sword. It was the left's victory in the battle of ideas that enabled them to tame a population that a century ago reacted with horror at Lloyd George's mockery of the peerage as 'five hundred men, ordinary men, chosen by accident from among the unemployed'. This is the first of a series of posts that seeks to challenge the monopoly liberal political theory possesses in the intellectual debate on the constitution.

The constitutional reform that has been consistently pursued by all governments of a radical persuasion over the last century has been reform of the House of Lords. Such a reform was, after succeeding in limiting the powers of the Upper House by the Parliament Act 1911, consistently frustrated until 1999 when the House of Lords Act removed the automatic right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the Upper House. In practise, however, the introduction of life peerages in 1958 had diluted the aristocratic character of the House, and together with plans to separate the Law Lords from the legislature by setting up an independent supreme court, these reforms have severely diminished the old constitution of the House of Lords until such a time as a radical government is persuaded to complete a comprehensive reform. With all this change it is imperative to look at the grounds for reform and decide whether they are just and reasonable or simply constitutional vandalism.

The old House of Lords rested on principally on the pillar of the hereditary peerage. This has been the traditional bugbears of radicals, one of whom, Alfred Russell Wallace, felt obliged in 1892 to describe it 'as wholly out of place in the parliament of a people which claims to possess both political and religious freedom'. In reality, as Labour readily admitted when pushing through the reforms of 1999, the reformers have been motivated by the simple desire to remove a sure bulwark against socialism rather than for any supposed desire to hand all power over to the people. Trade unionists have proved particularly keen to abolish the hereditary principle, though they apparently view the smooth transition of power from one generation of old Labourite families to another as entirely legitimate procedure (e.g. the Benns and the Callaghans).

Walter Bagehot, the great Victorian constitutionalist, identified the distinction between the dignified elements of the constitution and its efficient parts. The dignified theory, with all the accompanying ceremonial, gave legitimacy to an institution, while its efficient parts determined how it operated. In Bagehot's time most defences of the House of Lords were based on its value in its dignified capacity, while most opposition to it was from the quarter of efficiency. That state of affairs has since been reversed. Not even the most ardent conservative during the height of the Thatcher years would dare defend the hereditary principle as a principle, they merely pointed out that it works. And it that respect they were certainly right. An Upper House composed largely of hereditary peers does its job perfectly well. But then so could an elected senate, or an appointed chamber, or an assembly chosen by lot. Many different forms of legislature can put a good show when actually legislating. They are, after all, made up of human beings who are not generally imbecilic. The real question is one of legitimacy.

This question, therefore, is what I shall consider. Is the presence of hereditary peers in the Second Chamber legitimate? The hereditary principle is actually very easy to defend. All of us desire to leave names, traditions and property to our posterity. To defend hereditary rights is simply to defend the family. By moudling our institutions according to the order of nature we furnish them with the respect children have for their parents. States are, after all, simply extensions of the family, held together by blood and history. Burke expresses this truth most eloquently in his famous Reflections on the Revolution in France. That great conservative noted that, 'in this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood, binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties, adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections, keeping inseparable and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars'.

Nature is not the only legitimiser of heredity; the latter undeniably has an aura of sanctity about it. The battle over the Second Chamber's future was described by John Wells in his highly readable overview of the institution, The House of Lords, as a struggle between the Shining Ladder, the hierarchical vision, and the Bright Horizon, the egalitarian vision. The latter was formulated in the minds of mere men while the latter has at its heart that vision of divine order and of the 'Christian love governing creation' that is perhaps best represented in St. John's vision of God enthroned and surrounded by a council of elders, all with golden crowns on their heads. If there is a hierarchy among the angels and saints in Heaven, how can it be immoral to have one among men on earth?

Which leads us to consider more specifically the case of the hereditary peerage. If the family is the basis of the State how can we deny the most distinguished families in the land their position in the constitution their ancestors played so great a part in building? If noble families have great and natural influence in the country, if they are the leaders and guardians of property, if they are entitled to respect on account of their birth and rank, how can they not be one of the great estates of the realm, worthy of separate representation in Parliament? For a nobleman to have an equal vote with a commoner is to proclaim political equality, a theory that is manifestly not in accord with society's natural hierarchy. Furthermore, the status of the nobility as a distinct social and political caste serves to support that other great institution built in the light of the Shining Ladder, the monarchy itself. The Crown is, after all, the apex of our hierarchical society, but, to adapt Burke, every polished Corinthian capital requires an stable pillar to maintian it. The same principle that would commend the abolition of the political role of the peerage would also have us declare a republic.

Radicals will no doubt say this is a fit of pique from a dyed in the wool traditionalist, with no foundation in reason. But it is hardly rational to devise a government that does not take into account the natural state of the governed. The fact is that there will always be aristocrats, great landowners and important military families and these will always have influence. As Bagehot noted, 'an old lord will get infinite respect ... they [the people] will listen to his nonsense more submissively than the new man's sense'. This is especially true of a people like the British who have such a great attachment to hereditary distinctions. It is sometimes suggested that peers are unpopular with the masses. If that were true, why do the latter desire to socialise with and marry the former? There is no basis for anything, moral or rational, that does not find its root in the natural order. Inverting that order, as happened on the Continent, would result in political and social instability and threats to inherited liberties and property everywhere.

In 1867 it was put about that the cure for admiring the House of Lords was to go and see it. Put another way, people might venerate and respect the order of nobility, the dignified institution, but the latter served no efficient function. In fact, this criticism that hereditary peers were not involving themselves in the business of government at the time was quite unfair. Rather, the House of Lords was criticised for being involved in defeating legislation that Radical and Liberal governments wished passed. Nonetheless, opposition to the Lords on the grounds that they are not an effective senate, while less prominent in the arguments of modern reformers, remains a common point of view. It is, however, not only a mistaken viewpoint, but the opposite is true, only the House of Lords can provide an effective second chamber for Britain.

To analyse this question of efficiency we have to bear in mind what a senate is actually supposed to do. Such a body is, essentially, a deliberative assembly, a forum through which the restraining influence of the great interests and stakeholders in a country can be brought to bear. The question is whether 'an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles', as the Lords are derogatorily referred to in the Federalist Papers, can be Macdonald's 'sober body of second thought'. The answer is yes.

Leftists will at this point raise the rudimentary objection that 'accident of birth' is not an attribute sufficient to make a good legislator. That is true. But democratic election is also not such an attribute. Nor is appointment, or lot, or any other form of selection that can be imagined. Human nature being what it is, any system that is operated by human beings will have good and bad products. But an exception does not make a rule. The vast majority of hereditary peers are not moronic fools, to suggest that is just as absurd as suggesting that a random cross section of the population is likely to consist of lunatics. An hereditary assembly is likely to be distinctly average in its membership, it will have some intellects, some fools, but a majority of privileged, but quite ordinary human beings, with the advantage of long years of both personal and ancestral experience in government. It is, I posit, quite a comforting thought to know that any Bill that comes up from the Commons is subjected to the common sense examination of people beholden to no-one, not the electorate, not the Prime Minister, nor even the Monarch. As an anonymous hereditary peer was supposed to have remarked during the battle over Mr. Wilson's attempt at reform in 1968, 'presumably it is no worse to be appointed by God than by Harold Wilson'. Moreover, not only do hereditary peers form an independent second chamber, they form a body that has real authority, on account of social and economic influence peers possess. An institution of elected or appointed officials can easily be steamrolled over by a determined administration, not so a House animated by tradition, ancient names, and lofty descent. There is no more ideal guardian of constitutional liberty and the rights of property we have inherited than a body of men who owe their position to those same inherited rights.

There is just one final point to make, that pertains not only to the debate over the House of Lords but to the general debate on constitutional reform. Any attempt to alter the fundamental constitution of our institutions is doomed to failure on account of the fact that the nation will simply not understand it. Take the example of France. Ever since she abolished her traditional form of government she has been continually vacillitating between different models of government and different electoral systems. It is all very well to say that democratic legitimacy is essential to any institution of government, but what sort of democracy? What manner of elections? Ultimately you will end up with the preferences of one intellectual or one generation affecting the constitution that determines how all future generations will be governed. Future generations will obviously disagree with the innovations of a former generation and consequently there will be no stability in our constitutional framework. The only source of legitimacy can be tradition because it uniquely can appeal to all generations. A senate, or second chamber, is supposed to consist of guardians, men of authority and influence and men who posses a stake in the country's past, present and future. The hereditary peerage clearly fits this model of guardianship and as it has the sanction of tradition it is the only body that can provide a second chamber capable of enduring past one or two generations.

Brown to meet the Pope

It was announced from 10 Downing Street that the Prime Minister will have an audience of the Pope in the Vatican.

Mr. Brown's official spokesman told the press that the visit was a chance to continue the friendly relations the United Kingdom and the Holy See have enjoyed ever since Elizabeth I reversed her father's bloodthirsty policy of religious uniformity and replaced it with the toleration of all Christian sects which do not believe in God. A BBC reporter reminded the official spokesman that Catholics actually do believe in God, to which the spokesman replied that he understood the Church of England to be engaging in 'significant ecumenical dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church devoted to resolving such minor doctrinal differences that unhappily divide Christians'. He also added that the Prime Minister was convinced that he and the Pope would find they have much in common, despite their disagreements on unimportant issues that bear no relevance to contemporary society, such as the sancitity of human life, the definition of marriage, and the meaning of life, the universe and everything.

The agenda for the meeting is understood to concentrate on the development of Third World countries into entirely independent and self sustaining nations so that they may be free to continue in such traditional practices as cannibalism, the mass starvation of their populations and the ritual murder of last year's political leaders. The Government firmly believes in the principle of respect for these fundamentals of the cultures of developing nations, the spokesman said.

The Vatican declined to comment on Downing Street's statement.

Monarchy, Equality and Diversity?

This would appear to be the new liberal creed.

The compulsion of Prince Harry, third in line to the British throne, to attend an equality and diversity course for the use of a racist term to a fellow officer cadet at Sandhurst has a certain irony about it. The idea of a royal prince being lectured on the merits of an egalitarian and multicultural society is patently ridiculous. Whatever the questions that may be asked about the prudence of Prince Harry's remarks, this episode has exposed the utter incompatibility of the egalitarian values stemming from revolutionary France that are held so dear by the left, with the institution of hereditary monarchy.

Modernisation has been billeted as the method of preserving the Crown in a society that no longer embraces deference and tradition as it used to. The reformers, as we shall call them, wish to abolish what they see as the embarrassing feudal remnants of a modern institution, such as the preference of males in the succession, bowing and courtseying to members of the royal family, and the association of the Head of State with a national tradition that is rooted in the historical experience of a particular ethno-cultural entity. It is of course the latter that has come in for criticism after the revelation of Prince Harry's ill-advised, yet innocent, remarks. How can, the reformers ask, the monarchy be the symbol of a classless society (to use Jack Straw's words) if it remains stuck in an imperialistic and upper class time-warp. And to classless society we might well add multicultural.

It is difficult to argue against such an approach, at least within the confines the liberal political culture has set down for any debate on such a subject. Since republicanism is clearly not a realistic option (as the nation more than anything simply does not understand or empathise with the republican spirit), the political correctness brigade want to make the Throne represent all the values they assume contemporary society embrace. The trouble is that these values run directly counter to the values that are the Throne's foundation. How is the idea of the royal dynasty representing the continuity and permanence of the nation sustainable, if the nation itself is diluted with elements that do not share our language, our culture, and do not have any link with the historic national community? If the very idea of national identity is perverted from its roots in blood and history to something little better than a voluntary association ascribing to values that any human being can hold, how can an institution that gave the country the former idea of national identity survive in a society that embraces the new one? Surely the result would no longer be a monarchy, but rather a celebrity family that occasionally dresses up and attends political events. The symbolic role of the Crown would wither away, it would be, to quote Bagehot, like letting daylight in on the magic.

Of course, it could be claimed that such a transformation has already happened, or at least that it is inevitable. But I think not. There have been crises in national identity before the advent of multiculturalism, and the twin problems of immigration and integration are not new. But in previous times the monarchy, along with our other traditional institutions such as Parliament and the Church, have acted as beacons of stability grafting even the most radical modernisers into a continuous national tradition that celebrates the past, embraces the present and prepares for the future. The monarchy cannot support an equal and diverse society because it is the symbol of an hierarchical and historic nation. So while I cannot but offer a reproach to Prince Harry on account of his imprudence, I must condemn the linkage of the institution he represents with the multicultural society.