There is no use in mincing words. Our constitution is under attack. Successive radical governments are continuing the war that Mr. Lloyd George declared upon it when he first introduced the Parliament Bill in 1910. Now the nation has endured more that ten years of direct assault on its revered institutions, and scarcely a pen has risen to the defence of the latter. For, in this matter, the pen is indeed mightier than the sword. It was the
left's victory in the battle of ideas that enabled them to tame a population that a century ago reacted with horror at Lloyd George's mockery of the peerage as 'five hundred men, ordinary men, chosen by accident from among the unemployed'. This is the first of a series of posts that seeks to challenge the monopoly liberal political theory possesses in the intellectual debate on the constitution.

The constitutional reform that has been consistently pursued by all governments of a radical persuasion over the last century has been reform of the House of Lords. Such a reform was, after succeeding in limiting the powers of the Upper House by the Parliament Act 1911, consistently frustrated until 1999 when the House of Lords Act removed the automatic right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the Upper House. In practise, however, the introduction of life peerages in 1958 had diluted the aristocratic character of the House, and together with plans to separate the Law Lords from the legislature by setting up an independent supreme court, these reforms have severely diminished the old constitution of the House of Lords until such a time as a radical government is persuaded to complete a comprehensive reform. With all this change it is imperative to look at the grounds for reform and decide whether they are just and reasonable or simply constitutional vandalism.
The old House of Lords rested on principally on the pillar of the hereditary peerage. This has been the traditional bugbears of radicals, one of whom, Alfred Russell Wallace, felt obliged in 1892 to describe it 'as wholly out of place in the parliament of a people which claims to possess both political and religious freedom'. In reality, as Labour readily admitted when pushing through the reforms of 1999, the reformers have been motivated by the simple desire to remove a sure bulwark against socialism rather than for any supposed desire to hand all power over to the people. Trade unionists have proved particularly keen to abolish the hereditary principle, though they apparently view the smooth transition of power from one generation of old
Labourite families to another as entirely legitimate procedure (e.g. the
Benns and the
Callaghans).
Walter Bagehot, the great Victorian constitutionalist, identified the distinction between the dignified elements of the constitution and its efficient parts. The dignified theory, with all the accompanying ceremonial, gave legitimacy to an institution, while its efficient parts determined how it operated. In Bagehot's time most defences of the House of Lords were based on its value in its dignified capacity, while most opposition to it was from the quarter of efficiency. That state of affairs has since been reversed. Not even the most ardent conservative during the height of the Thatcher years would dare defend the hereditary principle
as a principle, they merely pointed out that it works. And it that respect they were certainly right. An Upper House composed largely of hereditary peers does its job perfectly well. But then so could an elected senate, or an appointed chamber, or an assembly chosen by lot. Many different forms of legislature can put a good show when actually
legislating. They are, after all, made up of human beings who are not generally imbecilic. The real question is one of
legitimacy.
This question, therefore, is what I shall consider. Is the presence of hereditary peers in the Second Chamber legitimate? The hereditary principle is actually very easy to defend. All of us desire to leave names, traditions and property to our posterity. To defend hereditary rights is simply to defend the family. By moudling our institutions according to the order of nature we furnish them with the respect children have for their parents. States are, after all, simply extensions of the family, held together by blood and history. Burke expresses this truth most eloquently in his famous
Reflections on the Revolution in France. That great conservative noted that, 'in this choice of inheritance we have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood, binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic ties, adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family affections, keeping inseparable and cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities our state, our hearths, our sepulchres, and our altars'.
Nature is not the only legitimiser of heredity; the latter undeniably has an aura of sanctity about it. The battle over the Second Chamber's future was described by John Wells in his highly readable overview of the institution,
The House of Lords, as a struggle between the Shining Ladder, the hierarchical vision, and the Bright Horizon, the egalitarian vision. The latter was formulated in the minds of mere men while the latter has at its heart that vision of divine order and of the 'Christian love governing creation' that is perhaps best represented in St. John's vision of God enthroned and surrounded by a council of elders, all with golden crowns on their heads. If there is a hierarchy among the angels and saints in Heaven, how can it be immoral to have one among men on earth?
Which leads us to consider more specifically the case of the hereditary peerage. If the family is the basis of the State how can we deny the most distinguished families in the land their position in the constitution their ancestors played so great a part in building? If noble families have great and natural influence in the country, if they are the leaders and guardians of property, if they are entitled to respect on account of their birth and rank, how can they not be one of the great estates of the realm, worthy of separate representation in Parliament? For a nobleman to have an equal vote with a commoner is to proclaim political equality, a theory that is manifestly not in accord with society's natural hierarchy. Furthermore, the status of the nobility as a distinct social and political caste serves to support that other great institution built in the light of the Shining Ladder, the monarchy itself. The Crown is, after all, the apex of our hierarchical society, but, to adapt Burke, every polished Corinthian capital requires an stable pillar to maintian it. The same principle that would commend the abolition of the political role of the peerage would also have us declare a republic.
Radicals will no doubt say this is a fit of pique from a dyed in the wool traditionalist, with no foundation in reason. But it is hardly rational to devise a government that does not take into account the natural state of the governed. The fact is that there will always be aristocrats, great landowners and important military families and these will always have influence. As Bagehot noted, 'an old lord will get infinite respect ... they [the people] will listen to his nonsense more submissively than the new man's sense'. This is especially true of a people like the British who have such a great attachment to hereditary distinctions. It is sometimes suggested that peers are unpopular with the masses. If that were true, why do the latter desire to socialise with and marry the former? There is no basis for anything, moral or rational, that does not find its root in the natural order. Inverting that order, as happened on the Continent, would result in political and social instability and threats to inherited liberties and property everywhere.
In 1867 it was put about that the cure for admiring the House of Lords was to go and see it. Put another way, people might venerate and respect the order of nobility, the
dignified institution, but the latter served no
efficient function. In fact, this criticism that hereditary peers were not involving themselves in the business of government at the time was quite unfair. Rather, the House of Lords was criticised for being involved in defeating legislation that Radical and Liberal governments wished passed. Nonetheless, opposition to the Lords on the grounds that they are not an effective senate, while less prominent in the arguments of modern reformers, remains a common point of view. It is, however, not only a mistaken viewpoint, but the opposite is true,
only the House of Lords can provide an effective second chamber for Britain.
To analyse this question of efficiency we have to bear in mind what a senate is actually supposed to do. Such a body is, essentially, a deliberative assembly, a forum through which the restraining influence of the great interests and stakeholders in a country can be brought to bear. The question is whether 'an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles', as the Lords are derogatorily referred to in the
Federalist Papers, can be Macdonald's 'sober body of second thought'. The answer is yes.
Leftists will at this point raise the rudimentary objection that 'accident of birth' is not an attribute sufficient to make a good legislator. That is true. But democratic election is also not such an attribute. Nor is appointment, or lot, or any other form of selection that can be imagined. Human nature being what it is, any system that is operated by human beings will have good and bad products. But an exception does not make a rule. The vast majority of hereditary peers are not moronic fools, to suggest that is just as absurd as suggesting that a random cross section of the population is likely to consist of lunatics. An hereditary assembly is likely to be distinctly average in its membership, it will have some intellects, some fools, but a majority of privileged, but quite ordinary human beings, with the advantage of long years of both personal and ancestral experience in government. It is, I posit, quite a comforting thought to know that any Bill that comes up from the Commons is subjected to the common sense examination of people beholden to no-one, not the electorate, not the Prime Minister, nor even the Monarch. As an anonymous hereditary peer was supposed to have remarked during the battle over Mr. Wilson's attempt at reform in 1968, 'presumably it is no worse to be appointed by God than by Harold Wilson'. Moreover, not only do hereditary peers form an
independent second chamber, they form a body that has real
authority, on account of social and economic influence peers possess. An institution of elected or appointed officials can easily be steamrolled over by a determined administration, not so a House animated by tradition, ancient names, and lofty descent. There is no more ideal guardian of constitutional liberty and the rights of property we have inherited than a body of men who owe their position to those same inherited rights.
There is just one final point to make, that pertains not only to the debate over the House of Lords but to the general debate on constitutional reform. Any attempt to alter the fundamental constitution of our institutions is doomed to failure on account of the fact that the nation will simply not understand it. Take the example of France. Ever since she abolished her traditional form of government she has been continually vacillitating between different models of government and different electoral systems. It is all very well to say that democratic legitimacy is essential to any institution of government, but what sort of democracy? What manner of elections? Ultimately you will end up with the preferences of one intellectual or one generation affecting the constitution that determines how all future generations will be governed. Future generations will obviously disagree with the innovations of a former generation and consequently there will be no stability in our constitutional framework. The only source of legitimacy can be tradition because it uniquely can appeal to all generations. A senate, or second chamber, is supposed to consist of guardians, men of authority and influence and men who posses a stake in the country's past, present and future. The hereditary peerage clearly fits this model of guardianship and as it has the sanction of tradition it is the only body that can provide a second chamber capable of enduring past one or two generations.